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Abstract 
 This article examines the role of the Spanish Atomic Forum as the representative of the nuclear 
sector in the public arena during the golden years of the nuclear power industry from the 1960s to 1970s. It 
focuses on the public image concerns of the Spanish nuclear lobby and the subsequent information 
campaigns launched during the late 1970s to counteract demonstrations by the growing and heterogeneous 
anti-nuclear movement. 
 The role of advocacy of nuclear energy by the Atomic Forum was similar to that in other countries, 
but the situation in Spain had some distinguishing features. Anti-nuclear protest in Spain peaked in 1978 
paralleling the debates of a new National Energy Plan in Congress, whose first draft had envisaged a massive 
nuclearization of the country. We show how the approval of the Plan in July 1979, with a significant 
reduction in the nuclear energy component, was influenced by the anti-nuclear protest movements in Spain. 
Despite the efforts of the Spanish Atomic Forum to counter its message, the anti-nuclear movement was 
strengthened by reactions to the Three Miles Island accident in March 1979.  
 




The atomic debate erupted into the public sphere of Western countries during the 1960s and 1970s with 
confrontations between anti-nuclear activists and pro-nuclear associations. Waves of anti-nuclear protest 
spread rapidly in countries that had invested heavily in nuclear programs to meet the energy crisis in 1973. 
Public perception of nuclear power was becoming increasingly negative, and the term nuclear evoked 
widespread fears about accidents, radioactivity or bombs. In this context, the future of nuclear was highly 
dependent on public and political acceptance. Pro-nuclear coalitions were mainly composed of nuclear 
scientists and engineering firms, electric utilities, nuclear plant manufacturers, and agencies promoting 
nuclear power, i.e., the so-called “Atomic Industrial Establishment” (Lewis 1972). During the 1950s, 
Industrial Nuclear Forums were founded by pro-nuclear lobbies in countries utilizing or developing nuclear 
power. Their aim was to communicate favorable information on specific projects and on nuclear power in 
general in order to enhance the credibility of the nuclear industry and improve its public acceptance.  
The main goal of this study was to analyze the role played by the nuclear industry in Spain during 
the 1960s and 1970s in the context of a growing antinuclear movement and increasing concerns among the 
general population. There is a wide historiography on the introduction and development of nuclear energy in 
Spain, but it has mainly addressed political, military, or technological issues (Presas i Puig 2005, Romero 
and Sánchez-Ron 2001; Ordóñez and Sánchez-Ron 1996). Research has also focused on anti-nuclear activity 
in Spain during the final years of Franco regime (Costa 1976; Fernández 1999; López Romo 2008; López 
Romo and Lanero Táboas 2010). However, little attention has been paid so far to the role of the industry 
itself in the development of nuclear power in Spain or to the actions taken to counteract the rising anti-
3 
nuclear movement in the 1960s and 1970s.  
In a first attempt to fill this historiographical gap, we focused on the Fórum Atómico Español 
(Spanish Atomic Forum, hereafter FAE), the industrial association that promoted the interests of the nuclear 
sector in Spain. We sought to identify and clarify the main arguments of the nuclear sector in the Spanish 
public arena by analyzing the abundant material published by the FAE during the period from 1962 through 
1979, starting with the setting up of the FAE and ending after the Three Miles Island (hereafter TMI) 
accident. We shall also discuss the relevance of the accident in Harrisburg as a significant turning point in 
Spanish public opinion on the nuclear industry. 
We focus on the last years of this period, 1977 to 1979, which coincided with the discussion of a new 
National Energy Plan (hereafter NEP) in Congress, with some important local protests, and with the TMI 
accident. We completed our study of trends in Spanish public opinion by analyzing pro-nuclear and anti-
nuclear discourses in two leading newspapers of the time, ABC and El País, and in two of the most important 
regional newspapers, La Gaceta del Norte and El Periódico de Catalunya. 
 
Anti-nuclear movements in the decades of protest 
The 1960s were marked by public discontent organized in different types of protest movement, including the 
anti-nuclear wing of the environmentalist movement, the feminist movement, and the peace movement, with 
a varying degree of interactions among them (Kriesi et al. 1995: 8; Giugni 2004: 44-45). However, although 
the 1960s have usually been perceived as the decade of protest, it was the 1970s in which a wide variety of 
social movements entered the public arena (Freeman and Johnson 1999: 5). They maintained most of the 
structural goals underlying their creation during the 1960s, but their concerns and strategies changed in 
accordance with the new times. 
 The anti-nuclear movement provides a good illustration of this development. Nuclear power has 
always been controversial, and the distrust of the population and their gradual resistance were already 
manifest by the mid-1950s, mainly in protests by peace and nuclear disarmament movements against the 
hazards of nuclear weapons testing and their effects on the environment and neighboring populations (Taylor, 
1994). Nevertheless, public awareness of nuclear risks was not widespread until the expansion of nuclear 
power programs during the 1960s, when many more communities were affected by siting proposals (Surrey 
and Hugget 1976; Rudig 1990). 
The construction of nuclear power plants was promoted with particular intensity by governments 
during the 1973 energy crisis to reduce their dependence on oil and supposedly provide a cheap source of 
electricity. This development was led by the USA nuclear industry. In early 1973, the American Energy 
Commission (hereafter AEC) predicted a huge increase in nuclear capacity, with industry executives talking 
of “a net increase in utility commitment to nuclear power” and “the virtual collapse of competition from 
fossil fuels” (Walker 2006: 7-8). Several citizens' groups emerged to confront the expansion of the nuclear 
industry, and the 1970s saw a shift in the anti-nuclear movement toward protests against the development of 
4 
nuclear power as a source of energy. The nuclear power conflict became described as one of the most intense 
controversies in the history of technology (Kitschelt 1986: 57). 
 Anti-nuclear movements pursued distinct strategies and had a different impact on overall energy 
policy in each national case, depending on the political opportunity structure of the country in question 
(Kitschelt 1986: 57-85; Shawki 2010: 383-385).
1
 However, they all shared a number of common features that 
shaped the anti-nuclear struggle: a previous protest movement against nuclear weapons testing and against 
radioactive pollution; a rapid rise in environmental concerns during the 1960s; a movement towards greater 
social responsibility in science; and new cultural and political values opposed to the economic system and 
energy growth.
2
 Most of these concerns were also important to environmentalist and pacifist movements, but 
the anti-nuclear movement was distinguished by its focus on the specific risks of nuclear power, including 
the large-scale effects of a potential accident, the possibility of long-term mortality from cancer, the potential 
genetic effects on future generations, and the association between nuclear power and nuclear weapons 
(Surrey and Hugget 1976: 286-288; Rudig 1990). 
 The opposition to nuclear power was greater than expected, especially in Europe. In France, the first 
two decades of nuclear development took place in an atmosphere of political consensus, free from any public 
opposition until the early 1970s,
3
 Nevertheless, there were strong anti-nuclear protests against new siting 
proposals, especially in Fessenheim (1971) and Marckolsheim (1974) on the German border. A wave of 
protest rapidly spread to Germany and Switzerland, helped by the political opportunities presented in both 
countries through mass mobilizations for regional claims (Kriesi et al. 1995: 181). 
Anti-nuclear protests were connected across Europe, with the different movements imitating 
successful tactics employed in other countries (Kriesi et al. 1995; Taylor, 1994; Rudig 1990; Falk 1982; Mills 
and Williams 1986). They argued for a slowing in the growth of energy consumption and for the 
development of other energy sources, emphasizing the need for safeguards in relation to the transport, 
reprocessing, and disposal of radioactive materials (Surrey and Huggett 1976: 297-298; Rudig 1990: 112-
130). Major demonstrations against government nuclear plans took place in different countries during the 
1970s. The successful “Whyl experience” in Germany
4
 encouraged other mobilizations throughout Europe, 
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“Political opportunity structures are comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements, and historical 
precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in 
others.” (Kitschelt 1986: 58).  
2
 While we can find some similarities between the protests in Europe and the USA, Japan represents a particular case. The bombs in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the severe seismic conditions and the Bikini incident produced a complex and conflictive scenario around 
nuclear energy in Japan. The anti-nuclear opposition in Japan has been widely discussed by several authors, who have described the 
different facets of the Japanese anti-nuclear movement. For instance, Akaha (1985: 75-89) reports the influence of the anti-nuclear 
movement in the parliamentary resolution that has guided Japanese nuclear policy since the late 1960s, known as the “three 
nonnuclear principles”; while Higuchi emphasizes the environmentalist origins of the Japanese anti-nuclear movements against the 
centrality of Hiroshima and Nagasaki within this activism (Higuchi 2008). Nevertheless, there is a wide consensus about the major 
importance of the movement against nuclear tests in the mid-1950s, and more than one-third of the Japan population had signed a 
petition to ban nuclear tests by the summer of 1955 (Yamazaki 2009: 132-145). 
3
 Political, economic and labor representatives worked together to rebuild the national industry complex, and they agreed in the 
creation of a new electric utility (Electricité de France) and the atomic energy commission, strongly supported by De Gaulle (Hetch 
1996: 486-488). 
4
 Wyhl, a small village in the southwestern corner of Germany, was proposed in 1971 as a possible site for a nuclear power station. In 
the years that followed, the incipient local opposition had little impact on politicians and planners. Official permission for the plant 
was granted and earthworks began on February 17 1975 (Patterson 1986: 113). Just the day after, local people spontaneously 
5 
including strong protests in Austria, Switzerland, France, and Spain (Mills and Williams 1986: 375-376).  
  Among the numerous local anti-nuclear protests in the USA during the 1970s, some captured public 
attention at a national level, including activities by the Clamshell Alliance protests at Seabrook Station 
Nuclear Power Plant and by the Abalone Alliance at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. After the 1979 
TMI accident, protests spreads around the country, and 65,000 people joined a large demonstration against 
nuclear power in Washington D.C. in May 1979 (Giugni 2004: 44-45). 
 
The backlash: Reaction of the industrial lobbies 
During the post-war years and the Cold War, the positive perception and acceptance of nuclear power was 
influenced by propaganda techniques and communication campaigns targeting public opinion. The best 
example was the Atoms for Peace program developed by the Eisenhower administration (Krige 2006; Weart 
1988; Hewlett and Holl 1989; Forgan 2003). 
When the civil atomic programs started in the 1950s, they were led by different governmental 
nuclear agencies and involved both private and public investment (Hewlett 1990). The US Atomic Industrial 
Forum (hereafter AIF) was created in 1954 and represented more than 400 companies and private 
corporations in the nuclear field by 1956. In the United Kingdom, the British Nuclear Energy Society and the 
Institution of Nuclear Engineers began to serve the industry and represent its interests in 1956, a few years 
after the British nuclear industry first came into being (British Nuclear Energy Society 1956). During the late 
1950s, following the creation of the AIF, several industrial associations were established in Europe, such as 
the Deutsches Atomforum in Germany; the Forum Atomique Français in France and the Forum Italiano 
Dell’Energia Nucleare in Italy. The European Atomic Forum, Foratom, the Brussels-based trade association 
for the nuclear energy industry in Europe, was founded in 1959 (Caro et al. 1995: 398). 
After the first substantial opposition to a planned reactor in the 1950s in the USA (Goodman 1961), 
leaders of the industry started to become worried about a hazard that was new for them.
5
 By 1969, the AIF's 
Public Affairs and Information Committee was alarmed about the rising anti-nuclear movements and about 
the growing national press coverage of the issue.
6
 During the early 1970s, even some of the most aggressive 
promoters of nuclear energy at the political level took serious note of the environmental concerns and anti-
nuclear opposition. Several states proposed more restrictive environmental legislation for nuclear sites 
                                                                                                                                                                  
occupied the site and the police used force to remove them two days later, on February 20. Television coverage of the rough 
treatment of the local farmers by the police contributed to turn nuclear power into a major national issue (Fach and Grande 1992: 20). 
Subsequent support came from the university town of Freiburg, when about 30,000 people re-occupied the Wyhl site on February 23. 
The Wyhl occupation and the subsequent demonstration in Freiburg generated extensive debate in Germany and, on March 21 1975 
an administrative court withdrew the construction license for the plant (Rudig 1990: 130-135; Mills and Williams 1986: 375-376; 
Gottlieb 2005: 237). The plant was never built and the land eventually became a nature reserve. The importance of the Wyhl 
experience in encouraging the emergence of local and regional grassroots activism has been highlighted (Mills and Williams 1986: 
375-376;  Rudig 1990). The growing protest after the Whyl conflict has been described as a prelude to the “sudden death” of the 
nuclear program in the late 1970s (Fach and Grande 1992: 20-21). Anti-nuclear success at Wyhl also inspired nuclear opposition in 
the rest of Europe and North America (Patterson 1986: 113; Gottlieb 2005: 237; Rudig 1990: 130-135). 
5
 The members of the AIF  and  the  insurance  companies pointed out  that  the risks associated with  fuel production, reprocessing 
and waste storage were  as great  in  the long term as those associated with the reactors. See Damian (1992: 606). 
6
 The Chair of this Committee cited the article “The nukes are in hot water”, published in 1969 by Sports Illustrated, as the first 
indication of this change (Balogh 1991: 264). 
6 
(Balogh 1991: 265-285). Consequently, the AIF and the energy-utility complex focused their efforts on the 
delegitimization of the anti-nuclear movement rather than on a public debate about nuclear hazards.
7
 
The best example of this public struggle was “Proposition 15” in the California election in June 
1976. The Proposition called for stricter legislative regulation of the nuclear power industry, and inspired six 
similar ballots in other states and in Switzerland. Representatives of the industry feared that success of the 
Proposition would have an anti-nuclear domino effect (Wellock 1998: 149). The nuclear industry in the USA, 
led by the AIF, made available a large number of documents arguing the pro-nuclear case. They mainly 
highlighted the possible economic effects of a nuclear moratorium, the environmental problems of coal 
mining, and the illegality of the Proposition (Kenward 1976). Notwithstanding the eventual rejection of the 
Proposition, it was perceived by the nuclear industry as a bittersweet victory because it had contributed to a 
gaining of momentum and influential support for the anti-nuclear movement (Wellock 1998: 332). 
 By the early 1970s, the electric companies were finding it increasingly difficult to obtain project 
licenses, and several projects in Europe and Japan had been withdrawn by 1972 due to local opposition 
(Young 1983: 1-16). Support for nuclear power was led by the national industrial associations, which 
launched various communication campaigns highlighting the need for nuclear power in the context of an 
energy crisis. These campaigns detailed the high safety standards in nuclear industry and promoted 
consultation processes and public discussions with representatives of local communities, unions, and other 
civil associations affected by siting proposals (European Nuclear Society 1979; Surrey and Hugget 1976: 
299-300; Hetch 1996: 488-489; Yamazaki 2009: 137-138.).
 
In Spain, they also played on fears of becoming 
over-dependent upon oil and emphasized the presence of uranium reserves in the country (Sánchez-Vázquez 
2012: 77-78).  
 By the late 1970s, every country with a commercial nuclear program had experienced its own anti-
nuclear reaction with specific national characteristics. Advocates of nuclear energy were surprised by the 
intense public opposition to the large scale application of this energy source. However, the experience drawn 
from public hearings, debates, and face-to-face discussions with representatives of the anti-nuclear 
movements made them aware “of modes of thought and criteria of judgment that they had not previously 
encountered” (Häfele 1974: 303). 
 
The nuclear industry in Spain (1962-1976) 
The importance of the military nature of Franco regime in shaping the early Spanish interest in nuclear 
technology (Presas i Puig 2005; Ordóñez and Sánchez-Ron 1996) was consolidated by the discovery and 
exploitation of uranium deposits in Spain in the early 1950s.
8 
Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Program
9
 and 
                                                 
7
 As it was put by Frank Shants, special project manager of the New Hampshire Public Service Company “Instead of trying to arouse 
the public for nuclear power, we should change course and try to arouse the public against the antinuclear groups ...” (Davidon 1979: 
46). 
8
 Spain began its own production of uranium on an industrial scale, becoming the third country in Europe, after United Kingdom and 
France, with a pilot chemical treatment plant (Caro et al. 1995: 50-56). 
9
 The Spanish case shows the propaganda facet of the Atoms for Peace programme to perfection (Weart, 1988: 162-165).  On July 
1955, USA and Spain signed an agreement in Washington D.C. for cooperation “concerning civil uses of atomic energy”. The 
7 
the First International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy have been acknowledged as 
relevant factors encouraging the Spanish government to develop a Spanish nuclear power industry.
10
 The 
opening of the Spanish market to private American companies involved in the construction of power reactors 
was effectively promoted in this context. 
In the 1960s, there was a change in Spanish economic and social situation and an opening up to the 
outside world. Agreement was reached between the main Spanish political force, the falangists (nationalists), 
and the new technocrats on the need to encourage the development of nuclear energy. This agreement 
allowed “one of the poorest countries in Western Europe to enter the exclusive club of nuclear producing 
countries” (De la Torre and Rubio 2014: 2). However, while the falangists supported nuclear energy as a 
means of strengthening Spanish autonomy, the technocrats saw it as the best means to liberalize the national 
economy and promote the involvement of private companies in nuclear power production. The nationalist 
line was backed by the National Institute of Industry (Instituto Nacional de Industria, INI) headed by Juan 
Antonio Suanzes. The INI diverged from the official policies on nuclear power presented by the Nuclear 
Energy Board (Junta de Energía Nuclear, JEN), the governmental agency responsible for all aspects of 
nuclear management until the 1960s, when private industry started to gain importance in Spanish nuclear 
development (Romero and Sánchez-Ron 2001: 123-150; Gómez Mendoza 2007: 551-553; Sánchez-Vázquez 
2012: 68-70). 
These conflicts and divergences within the Spanish Government during the late 1950s are crucial for 
an understanding of this process. Faced with the obstructionist attitude of the INI, the JEN and the private 
companies adopted a policy of active cooperation at the experimental and technological level, supporting the 
proposals of the technocrats (Gómez Mendoza 2007: 551). 
Hence, the technocratic argument prevailed over the nationalist view, because the gradual 
international integration of the country made it easier for the Spanish industry to acquire foreign technology 
and buy nuclear reactors “keys-in-hand” (Presas i Puig 2005: 210-214; Romero and Sánchez-Ron 2001: 195-
201), although some major figures in the regime complained about Spain's self-imposed dependence on 
foreigners and its inappropriate industrial strategy (Presas i Puig, 2005: 214-215). This change in the attitude 
of the government can also be interpreted in the context of a new phase in global nuclear development, 
which demanded a new organization system focused on commercial reactors, as reported in other national 
cases
11
. In so doing, the leadership of the Spanish nuclear sector started to be transferred from the 
governmental Nuclear Energy Board to private industry (Presas i Puig 2009; Sánchez-Vázquez 2010: 85-90), 
                                                                                                                                                                  
agreement made it clear that the USA effectively controlled nuclear matters in Spain through the AEC. It also pointed out that 
“private organizations in either the USA or Spain may deal directly with private individuals and private organizations in the other 
country (Ordóñez and Sánchez-Ron 1996: 195-196). 
10
 The favorable climate of opinion in the Conference, as well as the estimations for the consumption of electricity in the sixties, 
pointed clearly to nuclear power as a solution, even when its economic viability remained controversial. (Weart 1988: 158; Barca 
Salom 2005: 163-181). 
11
 This model was based on linking together certain economic sectors, including infrastructure construction, electrical and 
metallurgical materials, and financing [banks, insurance]. It also reinforced commercial relationships with the United States (and to a 
lesser extent with Germany and France), which strengthened the military and geo-strategic position of Spain in the Western world 
(Romero and Sánchez-Ron 2001: 201; De la Torre and Rubio 2013: 2-3). 
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contributing to create what has been called the Spanish version of the “Nuclear Iron Triangle”
12
, which 
brought together politicians from the government, technicians and scientists from the Nuclear Energy Board, 
and representatives from private companies (De la Torre and Rubio 2014: 16). 
 The Spanish nuclear industry “boom” began in 1963, when a newly founded company, Nuclenor, 
was licensed to build a nuclear power station in Santa María de Garoña, Burgos. The reactor was purchased 
“keys-in-hand” from General Electric. Simultaneously, the company Cenusa applied for permission to build 
a new power plant in Zorita, Guadalajara, which, in 1968, became the first to be successfully completed and 
operative in Spain. The reactor was purchased from Westinghouse (Romero de Pablos, 2012: 49-54; Caro et 
al. 1996: 355-360). In 1972, the newly founded nuclear company Hifrensa
13
 constructed the Vandellós I plant 
(Tarragona) using French technology based on natural uranium. In 1971 and 1972, six new 930 MW reactors 
were purchased from Westinghouse: Almaraz I and II; Lemóniz I and II, which were never completed; and 
Ascó I and II (Romero de Pablos, 2012: 55-58; Romero and Sánchez-Ron 2001: 254-260). 
 The energy crisis of 1973 brought a review of energy requirements and gave renewed impetus to the 
demand for nuclear power, as reflected in the first NEP of 1975. Eleven more stations were planned between 
1973 and 1976, but only four were finally completed (Sánchez-Vázquez 2010: 282-286).
 
While there was 
little participation by Spanish industry in the first three power plants (Burgos, Guadalajara, and Tarragona), 
this situation changed with the new power plants built in the 1970s, when up to 80% of projects were in the 
hands of private Spanish companies (Presas i Puig 2005: 217).  
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 Expression used by Brian Balogh for the Nuclear Program in the United States (Balogh, 1991). 
13
 Hispano Francesa de Energía Nuclear, formed by three electrical companies from Catalonia (Fecsa, Enher and Hidroeléctrica de 
Cataluña) and Electricité de France (EDF) (Anes et al 2001:47). 
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 Fig. 1 Nuclear power plants licensed in Spain 
 
 Paralleling this nuclear boom, the FAE was founded in 1962 to bring together industries involved in 
the nuclear sector and to increase their penetration of the Spanish energy market (Fórum Atómico Español 
1962: 2-10). The 50 founding companies included the main electric companies in Spain (i.e., Hidroeléctrica 
Española, Iberduero, Electra de Viesgo, Endesa, Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico, Unión Eléctrica Madrileña, 
Compañía Sevillana de Electricidad, and Hidroeléctrica de Cataluña), new companies established to manage 
Spanish nuclear facilities (i.e., Cenusa and Nuclenor), manufacturers of nuclear components and systems 
(i.e., Construcciones Nucleares and Sociedad Española de Construcciones Babcock y Wilcox), private 
engineering companies (i.e., Tecnatom and Estudios y Proyectos Eléctricos), the Spanish Nuclear Energy 
Board, insurance companies (i.e. Unión Iberoamericana and La Estrella), and a bank (Banco de Vizcaya) 
(Fórum Atómico Español 1962: 18-20). 
  Apart from acting as the voice of the industry in energy policy discussions and promoting the 
commercial uses of nuclear energy, FAE’s specific objectives and emphases changed over time to meet the 
needs of the sector. During the 1960s, FAE’s major concerns were the promotion of commercial nuclear 
power, the development of different technical aspects, and integration within Foratom, aimed at gaining 
influence in the European setting. To meet this last objective, the FAE set up several study groups to support 
the work of Foratom in specific tasks. During the celebration of the First Nuclear Conference organized by 
the FAE and held in Madrid in 1963, the Foratom Executive Committee held its first meeting in Spain to 
discuss the role of FAE in the organization. The president of the FAE, José María Oriol, was named vice-
10 
president of Foratom in 1964 and became president of the organization in 1966, strengthening the influence 
of the FAE in the European nuclear field during the late 1960s (Caro et al. 1996: 398-399). 
In this context of euphoria for the Spanish nuclear sector, changes in Spanish socio-political situation 
brought the public relations aspect into prominence during the early 1970s (Romero and Sánchez-Ron 2001: 
260; Sánchez-Vázquez 2010: 85-90).  
 
The late anti-nuclear awakening in Spain: From Palomares (1966) to the “Long Anti-nuclear March” 
(1974-1977) 
During the 1960s, social opposition to nuclear energy was almost an irrelevant issue in Franco´s Spain, 
attributable to the prohibition by the powerful repressive system of any expression of opposition or 
questioning of the regime´s policies (Ysás 2007: 32). FAE´s activities during this decade showed a 
remarkable lack of concern about public opinion in comparison to the European or American cases. This 
position did not even change after the so-called “Palomares incident” in 1966, one of the most high-profile 
accidents involving American nuclear weapons outside the USA. On January 17 1966, a USAF B-52G 
bomber collided with a KC-135 tanker during mid-air refueling off the coast of Spain. Out of the four Mk28 
type hydrogen bombs lost by the bomber, three were found on land near the small fishing village of 
Palomares in Almería, Southern Spain. The non-nuclear explosives in two of the bombs detonated upon 
impact, contaminating an area of two square kilometers with radioactive plutonium. The fourth bomb, which 
fell into the Mediterranean Sea, was recovered intact after a 12-week search (Megara 2006; Ordóñez and 
Sánchez-Ron 1996: 212). 
Spanish government applied its usual propaganda methods to defuse possible social alarm about 
environmental pollution. Spanish Official Newsreel NO-DO, which was the main source of visual 
information for Spaniards up to the late 1960s, covered a swim by the Minister of Tourism Fraga Iribarne 
and the US ambassador Angier Biddle Duke at Palomares beach in March 1966, which became an enduring 
image of nuclear power in Franco’s Spain. Nevertheless, the incident became the starting point for structured 
and visible opposition to nuclear energy in Spain (Sánchez-Vázquez 2010: 218-229). 
 There is a surprising lack of references to the incident in FAE publications. Up to this point, almost 
all references in FAE publications about anti-nuclear demonstrations or public opinion came from abroad.
14
 
This could be attributed to the immaturity and lack of developed structure of the anti-nuclear movement in 
Spain and to the government support for the sector, but it may also reflect a conscious strategy of the nuclear 
lobby to invisibilize the movement. 
 However, in response to the considerable number of new nuclear power plants planned in the first 
NEP in 1975, a strong anti-nuclear movement emerged in the 1970s in Spain, which ultimately prevented the 
completion of most of the projects. All of the local and regional demonstrations against the new planned 
stations became known as the Long Anti-Nuclear March (Larga marcha antinuclear) (Fernández 1999: 119-
                                                 
14
 In the Boletines Informativos of 1966, periodicals edited by the FAE during that year, there is a total lack of references to the 
incident (Fórum Atómico Español, 1966a to 1966e). 
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129). The first protest actions began in 1974 in the Basque Country and Navarra against projects in Ea-
Ispaster, Deba, and Tudela (López Romo and Lanero Táboas 2010; López Romo, 2008). Several heated 
demonstrations took place in the affected regions during 1975, and power plant projects in Sástago and 
Escatrón (Aragón); Xove (Galicia); Tarifa and Doñana (Andalusia), and Águilas (Murcia) were withdrawn 
(Costa 1976: 50-75). 
 Given the political situation in Spain during the 1970s, it would not be accurate to refer to a 
homogeneous “Spanish” anti-nuclear movement. The anti-nuclear protests were closely linked to nationalist 
and pro-independence movements in regions like Catalonia, the Basque Country or Galicia, which 
influenced the shaping and development of these protests (Mora Ticó 2012; López Romo and Lanero Táboas 
2010; López Romo, 2008). In fact, the proliferation of discourses and collective actions of opposition to 
nuclear power plants became a valuable tool for nationalist movements to expand their presence in the public 
arena in terms of the political opportunities presented by mass mobilizations. In other Spanish regions, the 
arguments against nuclear power were posed in non-nationalist terms, and the protests contributed to 
strengthening the associative movement and the demands for democracy (López Romo and Lanero Táboas 
2010: 751-752).  
 In order to coordinate and draw together these regional mobilizations, a national organization was 
created in Soria in May 1977: the Anti-nuclear State Coordinator (Coordinadora Estatal Antinuclear, 
hereafter CEA). It was driven by such organizations as the Anti-Nuclear Committee of Catalonia (Comité 
Antinuclear de Cataluña), or the Defense Committee for a Non-Nuclear Basque Coast (Comisión de Defensa 
de una Costa Vasca No Nuclear). CEA did not have a stable structure or a fixed membership for 
organizations, which were able to join and leave freely. It usually met three times a year, with periods of 
higher and lower frequency (Cabal 1996; Bigas 1991: 91-99). The structural demands of the anti-nuclear 
protest included the call for democracy, in common with other Spanish social movements of the time. During 
this period, from Franco´s death in 1975 to the first democratic elections in 1977, civil society in Spain 
experienced a turbulent and exciting time and anti-nuclear movements reached their peak (Preston 1986: 60-
72; Ysás 2007).  
 FAE’s publications included several statements by representatives of the industry and nuclear 
institutions that expressed confidence in government support but also evidenced some disquiet about the 
outbreaks of unexpected opposition. This increasing anxiety is reflected in the topics chosen for FAE 
conferences and lectures. By 1977, the Spanish nuclear sector was fully aware of the problems related to the 
anti-nuclear movement.
15
 The Annual Nuclear Symposium organized by the FAE that year included a session 
devoted to “Nuclear Energy and Public Opinion”, in which Spanish nuclear industry representatives 
described their increasing concerns about the public reaction (Fórum Atómico Español, 1977c). 
 
Lemóniz conflict, the drafting of the second National Energy Plan and the reaction of the Spanish 
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 As reflected in periodicals published during 1976 and 1977, which started to express the increasing worries of the sector (Fórum 
Atómico Español, 1976, 1977a, 1977b). 
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Atomic Forum (1978) 
Two major anti-nuclear events took place in Spain in 1978: conflict around the Lemóniz Nuclear Power Plant 
in the Basque province of Vizcaya and mobilizations in advance of the approval of the second NEP in July 
1979. The building of the power station in Lemóniz was opposed by ETA, the paramilitary Basque 
independence organization, as well as by the anti-nuclear organization the Defense Committee for a Non-
Nuclear Basque Coast and several anti-nuclear local committees created in different towns (López Romo 
2008: 13). They pointed to the lack of an operating license by Iberduero (the company in charge) and 
highlighted the hazards of nuclear waste (La Gaceta del Norte 1976a; López Romo 2011). In August 1976, a 
massive demonstration against the power plant took place near Plentzia and Górliz, two small towns near 
Lemóniz
16
. On December 18 1977, an ETA commando unit attacked a Guardia Civil post guarding the 
station, and one of the unit, was injured in the attack and died a month later. On March 17 1978, ETA planted 
a bomb in the reactor of the station, leaving two workers dead and more than a dozen injured (López Romo 
2008; La Gaceta del Norte 1978a). The explosion also caused substantial material damage to the facility
17
, 
forcing Iberduero to delay its construction (Mez et al. 2009: 371; López Romo 2011).  The outbreak of 
violence and the deaths prompted considerable condemnation in the regional press (La Gaceta del Norte 
1978b) and provoked intense debate within the Basque anti-nuclear movement (López Romo 2008: 16).  
 It was under these conflictive circumstances that the discussion on the second NEP took place, 
bringing the nuclear issue to the forefront of public debate. The second NEP resulted from political 
agreements reached during the so-called Pactos de la Moncloa (Moncloa Pacts) in 1977, which involved all 
democratic political forces in Spain committed to a stable transition to a democratic system (Cuerdo 1999: 
165). The first draft of the second NEP proposed a significant increase of 37.7% over the nuclear power 
supply proposed in the first NEP (Ministerio de Industria y Energía 1978). The anti-nuclear movement 
reacted to this nuclearization proposal with intense demonstrations, and demands for a moratorium were 
included in the political programs of the Socialist (PSOE) and Communist (PCE) Spanish parties. These 
political pressures forced the Ministry of Industry to draw up an alternative NEP. The media were paying 
increasing attention to the arguments around energy policy, and the energy sector and the FAE contracted 
public relations agencies in order to strengthen its position in the public debate (El País 1978a). 
 The redrafting of NEP was highly controversial, even within the Spanish government. It caused an 
open confrontation between the Ministries of Industry and Economy. The Minister of Industry and his team 
were radically opposed to Minister of Economy’s proposal for the nationalization of all nuclear plants built 
after 1987 (El País 1978b). Based on new projections for future energy demand and the availability of local 
resources (coal and hydraulic power), the second draft of the NEP included a reduction of the nuclear energy 
program contemplated in the first draft, authorizing the construction of only three new plants in addition to 
the seven already under construction. This implied the withdrawal of authorization for six plants awaiting 
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 The attendance figures vary according to different sources, but  the response was massive: between 15,000 and 50,000 people (La 
Gaceta del Norte 1976b; López Romo and Lanero Táboas 2010: 760). 
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 Property damage was assessed at several hundred million pesetas according to sources close to Iberduero (La Gaceta del Norte 
1978c). 
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approval at that time. The Minister of Industry supported this reduction by arguing that the earlier nuclear 
plans had been based on an accumulated annual economic growth of around 6% that had been reduced to 
4%. The new draft was the cause of bitter controversy between the Ministry and the private sectors involved 
in the nuclear program (El País 1978c). 
 The daily press also reflected the rising anti-nuclear environment. In May 1978, the newborn center-
left newspaper El País published an editorial entitled “Promises and dangers of nuclear energy” (El País 
1978d). It criticized the huge investment planned for the construction of nuclear power plants (estimated at 
around 325,000 million pesetas). It criticized the government’s commitment to nuclear energy as a means of 
limiting the dependence on oil, claiming that it ignored the potential hazards of environmental pollution or 
catastrophic accident. 
 A month later, the sociologist Mario Gaviria, one of the leaders of environmental activism in Spain, 
described  “planning errors committed by the main electric companies between 1969 and 1972, when they 
decided on the nuclearization of Spain” (El País 1978e). According to Gaviria, the NEPs were ideological 
documents used to correct successive forecast errors by the electricity sector and to support investment by 
private companies in nuclear power plants. He also suggested that the underlying objective of the Plan, 
advocated by the Americans and supported by the Spanish electric and nuclear sector, was to replace oil with 
nuclear energy (El País 1978e).
  
 The FAE emerged as the public representative of the nuclear sector in response to this negative 
environment for nuclear energy in Spain. The FAE made strong efforts to counteract the opposition through 
public interventions in the print media, radio and TV. Alfonso Álvarez Miranda, the president of the FAE, led 
these appearances in the media during the first half of 1978, with forthright statements that “saying no to 
nuclear energy, is saying yes to the recession and unemployment” and that “causes of opposition to nuclear 
power have no serious scientific basis but underlying emotional causes, as the memories of the atomic bombs 
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (ABC 1978a). He also described the opposition to nuclear energy as 
more ideological than technical, and insisted that nuclear energy was necessary, safe and affordable (ABC 
1978b). Hence, the nuclear sector strategy focused on the need for nuclear energy for economic development 
and attempted to delegitimize the opposition as “less technical” and prone to unfounded fears associated with 
the memories of Hiroshima and nuclear bombs tests. These arguments were similar to those propagated by 
other nuclear lobbies during the 1970s. 
Besides the FAE, the nuclear option was strongly supported in this debate by other representatives of 
the private energy sector, such as the managers of oil and electric companies, as revealed in a “Survey among 
energy sector experts” published by ABC in May 1978.
18
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 The survey was conducted among five leading experts of the Spanish energy sector. These experts were Alfonso Alvarez Miranda, 
president of FAE; Emilio Sanz Hurtado, manager of the oil company Petroliber and member of the Technical Commission of the 
Minister of Economy for the drafting of the NEP; Roberto Centeno, manager of the energy company Campsa and also member of the 
Technical Commission of the Minister of Economy; Juan Alegre Marcet, president of Unesa (Association of Spanish electric 
companies), and Julio Calleja González-Camino, president of Hispanoil (another oil company). The survey comprised two questions: 
1. Do you support nuclear energy? 2. Would you nationalize the sector? To the first question, all five answers were “yes”, and in a 
categorical manner. For the second question, there was a more nuanced response, with 2 “yes” and 3 “no” (ABC 1978c). 
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 A draft of the second NEP was presented to Congress in July 1978, after major amendments to 
earlier drafts. According to El País, the positive reaction of the electrical and nuclear sectors indicated that 
the private sector had again won the battle (El País 1978f). However, the NEP failed to gain approval, and 
public debate on energy policy continued throughout the second half of 1978, with no changes in the 
arguments presented by each side (El Periódico de Catalunya 1978a). 
The first turning point in the nuclear debate was prompted by the celebration of the Austrian 
referendum on nuclear energy on November 5 1978, related to approval for the start-up of the Zwentendorf 
Nuclear Power Plant (Hirsch and Nowotny 1977; Pelinka 1983: 253-261). The referendum resulted in a 
narrow majority against the Zwentendorf plan and represented an unexpected defeat for the European 
nuclear lobby as a whole. The right-wing newspaper ABC published a special report on the possibility of a 
nuclear referendum in Spain (ABC, 1978d) that included statements by representatives of the nuclear sector 
(e.g., the FAE President and the Director of the Nuclear Energy Board) on the need for nuclear energy to 
ensure the economic development of the country (ABC, 1978e). The “bases of the anti-nuclear opposition” 
were described by the ABC editorial staff on the same page as: the incomplete or developing nature of the 
technology; ecological disruption and pollution; lack of economic viability; progressive restriction of 
freedoms to guarantee the security of nuclear facilities; higher concentration of economic and political 
power; and increasing foreign dependence in energy matters (ABC 1978f).  
  The FAE intensified its efforts to counteract the increasingly negative perception of the public and to 
support the nuclear option in the drafting of the new NEP. Besides the public appearances in the media, it set 
up a “Public Information Campaign” similar to those organized by the Industrial Forums in the USA, France 
and Switzerland and to the campaign launched by Foratom in the same year (Fórum Atómico Español 1978a: 
8). One of the main features of the campaign was the creation of a Public Opinion Working Group focused 
on designing and carrying out opinion polls. According to the polling results obtained, nuclear energy was 
perceived as the most dangerous and most polluting option
19
. It was seen as something new and mysterious 
but with a bad reputation.  In comparison to a poll by the Minister of Industry in 1975, the new polls revealed 
a worsening of the public image of the nuclear industry (Fórum Atómico Español 1978a: 8). Other activities 
of the Working Group included the compilation of favorable news clippings for sending to news agencies 
(Fórum Atómico Español 1978c: 3) and an “immediate response” service to counter stories or articles in the 
daily press that cast nuclear energy in a negative light (Fórum Atómico Español 1978d: 32-35). The public 
information campaign also involved the publication of documents and public reports advocating nuclear 
energy, the selection of audiences and topics for conferences or talks given by members of the FAE, and the 
achievement of media coverage for their presentations (Fórum Atómico Español 1978b: 24). 
 Further research is required to establish whether FAE’s public information campaign was effective in 
changing the public perception of nuclear energy. However, one example of the limited success of FAE’s 
attempts to reshape the debate on nuclear energy in Spain may be the objections to the NEP draft raised by 
                                                 
19 The survey was carried out during January and February 1978 by the consulting agency AGEUROP (Fórum Atómico Español 
1978a: 8-10). 
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all political groups when it was discussed in Congress in December 1978, leading to the need for it to be 
redrafted once again (El Periódico de Catalunya 1978b). 
 
The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident and the decline of the nuclear industry in Spain 
The TMI accident is known as the first “major” accident in nuclear industry history. It occurred at TMI 
Power Plant in Pennsylvania, on March 28 1979. It represented a major shock to the nuclear industry, which 
had emphasized the safety of the plants as one of the main arguments in the pro-nuclear discourse during the 
1970s. While the public health consequences of the accident remain controversial and have been described as 
“frustratingly ambiguous” (Walker 2000),
 
consensus has been achieved on its major impact on the economy 
and on public opinion. According to the IAEA, the TMI accident was a significant turning point in the global 
development of nuclear power.
20
 However, it has been claimed the accident did not initiate the demise of the 




 The first reactions to the accident came from the US Nuclear industry representatives. In a display of 
humility and concern, the president of the AIF Carl Walske declared: “I thought we were better than that 
before the accident happened”. In addition, William J. Lannouette, a journalist specialized in nuclear power, 
reported that some of them were “stunned and dispirited” (Walker 2006: 222). The nuclear sector as a whole 
decided to take action to deal with the crisis. The AIF established a committee to coordinate communication 
activities, realizing that this accident could cause severe damage to the nuclear industry worldwide (Walker 
2006: 223). 
 In Spain, the impact of the accident on public opinion was a matter of great concern to FAE leaders 
and the pro-nuclear lobby. Fears were also raised about its effects on the prospects for the NEP, which had 
yet to be approved and remained under public debate (Fórum Atómico Español 1979b: 5-7). At a conference 
held in Bilbao on the day after the accident, the new President of FAE, José Antonio Gallego Gredilla, stated 
that they had to stick to the "cold language of science, facts, and logic" against the "emotional and passionate 
arguments" used by anti-nuclear protestors (La Gaceta del Norte 1979). 
 During 1979, some major anti-nuclear demonstrations took place in Spain against the NEP and in 
favor of a nuclear moratorium, especially in Barcelona (El Periódico de Catalunya 1979a/ 1979b). Days after 
the accident, in April 1979, a group of Spanish environmental organizations publicly called for the 
immediate cessation of the Spanish nuclear development program and a five-year moratorium on building 
nuclear power plants to provide time for a thorough debate on the risks. The group claimed that Spain could 
meet its energy needs without recourse to nuclear energy and demanded that the current NEP draft be 
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 From 1963 to 1979, the number of reactors under construction globally increased every year except in 1971 and 1978 (IAEA 
2012). However, following this event, the number of reactors under construction in the US declined every year from 1980 to 1998. 
Many similar Babcock and Wilcox reactors on order were canceled. Eventually, 51 American nuclear reactors were canceled from 
1980 to 1984 (EIA 1983). 
21
 As a result of post-oil-shock analysis and conclusions of overcapacity, many planned nuclear power plants had already been 
canceled between 1973 and 1979 due to more stringent Federal requirements, more strident local opposition and significantly 
lengthened construction times (Hertsgaard 1983: 95-97). 
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withdrawn from Congress and replaced by a transitional strategy that excluded nuclear energy (El País 
1979a).  
 The nuclear industry sector feared that the impact of the accident would focus the debate exclusively 
on nuclear policy. There were also concerns about the  plants under construction and those with prior 
authorization sector, given the support for the nuclear moratorium announced by the Socialist and 
Communist parties (Fórum Atómico Español 1979a: 17-20). The chairman of the Congress Energy 
Committee, Josep Maria Triginer, claimed that the accident could even reinforce the Spanish nuclear 
program if it led to improvements in safety measures, although he admitted that it could ultimately lead the 
government to reconsider the entire nuclear policy (El Periodico de Catalunya 1979c). 
 The government accepted the opposition’s proposals to improve the security and control of nuclear 
facilities, but the new Minister of Industry and Energy, Carlos Bustelo ruled out any consideration of a 
moratorium (ABC 1979). FAE representatives and the Working Group on Public Opinion published 
informative notes detailing the technical causes of the accident. However, a print media analysis carried out 
by the FAE yielded very disappointing results, because the nuclear sector had expected a less aggressive 
treatment of the issue by the media (Fórum Atómico Español 1979b: 7). 
 The new NEP was eventually approved by Congress on July 27 1979. The absence of previsions for 
the massive nuclearization of the country is attributable to the active civil opposition to the plan, the TMI 
accident, and delays in the construction of the new nuclear power plants due to the immense investment costs 
involved, among others (Cuerdo 1999: 161-178). Priority was given to local resources, such as coal and 
hydraulic power, as had been proposed in the second draft of the Plan. The approved NEP gave nuclear 
energy a place as a complementary source for completing the energy supply, but only under “the strictest 
security measures” (El País 1979b). This was seen as a victory for the environmentalist and anti-nuclear 
movements in Spain (Fernández 1999: 302) and a discouraging decision for the nuclear sector and the FAE. 
In late March 1984, the Socialist government approved a moratorium, and only 11 out of the 37 originally 
planned commercial nuclear reactors (including 20 already licensed) were finally built in Spain.  
  
Conclusion 
Although nuclear energy had been a controversial issue since the 1950s, the expansion of the nuclear 
industry during the 1960s and 1970s stimulated the growth of anti-nuclear movements and brought the 
nuclear debate into the public arena. Despite the complexity of the international anti-nuclear scenario in the 
late 1970s, several general trends can be identified, including the intensification of the protest as the growth 
of nuclear programs increased and the coalition of different interest groups against nuclear energy. Nuclear 
industrial associations emerged and played a key role in advocating nuclear energy with varying degrees of 
support from the national governments. 
As in other countries developing a nuclear program, the FAE took a leading role as representative of 
the Spanish nuclear sector. The lack of democracy in the 1960s reduced the importance and public visibility 
of anti-nuclear movements. Not surprisingly, therefore, FAE’s concerns about public opinion emerged later 
17 
than in other countries. By the mid-1970s, the combination of an intense anti-nuclear struggle and growing 
calls for democracy in Spain led the FAE to enter the public arena with different communication strategies. 
Their main arguments included the need for nuclear power to meet increasing energy needs, the problems of 
coal and alternative energy sources, and the high safety record of nuclear power. Their strategy was to 
oppose anti-nuclear claims on nuclear costs, safety and waste management. 
 Anti-nuclear protests peaked in Spain in the late 1970s during the long debate before approval of the 
second NEP in July 1979, confronting the pro-nuclear discourse with warnings about the potential dangers 
and the enormous investment required. The anti-nuclear movement in Spain was heterogeneous and highly 
influenced by regionalist and nationalist movements and by the demands for democracy, which gave anti-
nuclear protests in Spain certain distinctive features. The first NEP approved in 1975 envisaged what was 
perceived at the time as the nuclearization of Spain. After the first democratic elections in Spain in 1977, the 
so-called Pactos de la Moncloa generated a political commitment to mid-term energy planning resulting in 
the second 10-year NEP (1977-1987).  The public debate on nuclear energy taking place in the late 1970s 
around the drafting of the new NEP paralleled a deterioration of the public image of the nuclear industry, 
which was exacerbated by the results of the 1978 Austrian referendum on nuclear energy and especially by 
news of the TMI accident. In fact, the impact of the TMI accident appears to have been crucial in persuading 
the Spanish government to abandon their plan for nuclear energy to be the main energy source, as eventually 
embodied in the 1979 NEP.  From 1978 onwards, the FAE mounted a highly active public campaign to 
counteract the increasingly negative perception of nuclear energy in Spanish public opinion. The campaign, 
probably unrivalled in any other Spanish industrial sector, was similar to those launched by nuclear lobbies 
in the USA and the rest of Europe. The final version of the 1979 NEP was perceived by the FAE and the 
nuclear sector as a bitter defeat and by the Spanish environmental and anti-nuclear movements as a sweet 
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Comment 1. The 1955 conference in Geneva is misnamed: It was the 
International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. 
 
Response: We now give the correct name of the conference. 
 
Comment 2. Far more substantially, the author gives us no idea at all of the social make-up of 
the protest movement in Spain.  This is a serious omission and needs to be rectified.  Nor are 
we told much about the regional diversity of that protest movement.  We are made aware of 
ETAs violent opposition to nuclear power, but we are told little or nothing about the peaceful 
protesters in the Basque region, in Catalonia, and in the capital, Madrid — for example. 
Granted the importance of regional differences in Spain this is a nuance that needs to be 
included in a more detailed analysis of just who was against nuclear power, what forms their 
protest took, and how their opposition was managed by the authorities (apart from eventually 
backing off from their earlier strong support for the nuclear option). 
  
Response: We agree that it would be very helpful to provide further information on the 
regional diversity of the protest movement. We have included a new paragraph in section 5 
[The late anti-nuclear awakening in Spain: From Palomares (1966) to the “Long Anti-nuclear 
March” (1974-1977)] exploring how opposition to nuclear power plants became a valuable 
tool for the nationalist movements to expand their presence in the public space in terms of the 
political opportunities presented by mass mobilizations. Moreover, we have provided further 
details on the protests carried out in the Basque Country and Catalonia.  
 




Comment 1. The text first describes the American and European anti-nuclear movement, 
before introducing the Spanish case. However, it fails to take into consideration the fact that 
the latter was active during a brutal dictatorship which prohibited any expression of opposition 
or questioning of the regimes policies in any shape or form; in this case its political and 
economic policies. This aspect, which, when it is discussed in the text, is given insufficient 
clarity and importance, totally conditioned not only the policies of Francos regime with regard 
to nuclear development, but also the strategies of the Spanish anti-nuclear movement. The 
reality of the Spanish political situation in the 1960s, as well as in the 1970s and 1980s, makes 
it impossible to refer to a homogeneous "Spanish" anti-nuclear movement. The processes of 
national liberation (Catalonia, the Basque Country, later terrorist acts), open opposition to the 
dictatorship (far-left parties and non-parliamentary movements), the indecision and 
subsequent acceptance by the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and the Spanish Socialist Party 
(PSOE until the 80s) of the nuclear option, the anti-NATO movement, etc. make the Spanish 
case one that is difficult to compare with the rest of the international anti-nuclear movements 
in the way that the article seems to suggest. It is only later that the dynamics of the anti-
nuclear and pro-peace movement (against NATO) can be compared with other social 
movements in Europe: its (albeit indecisive) influence on the nuclear moratorium and the 
socio-cultural impact of the campaign against Spain joining NATO and against compulsory 
military service. 
In this regard, there are a number of publications that the author should take into account: 
Response to reviewer's comments
Raúl López Romo, (2008) «Tiñendo la patria de verde y violeta. Las relaciones del nacionalismo 
vasco radical con los movimientos antinuclear y feminista en la Transición», in: Ayeres en 
discusión: temas clave de Historia Contemporánea hoy", coord. by María Encarna 
Nicolás Marín, Carmen González Martínez, 2008. 
Raúl López Romo, Daniel Lanero Táboas.  Antinucleares y nacionalistas. Conflictividad 
socioambiental en el País Vasco y la Galicia rurales de la transición. Historia Contemporánea 
43: 749-777, 2010. 
Ladislao Martínez. El movimiento ecologista. La lucha antinuclear y contra el modelo 
energético en España. Mientras tanto, Nº. 91-92, 2004, pp. 83-106. 
Pere Mora Ticó. El moviment ecologista a Catalunya: el seu origen, evolució i inserció a la 
societat catalana. Doctoral thesis. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Barcelona, September 
2012. 
 
Response: We are very grateful for the information and references on the regional diversity of 
the protest movement. We have included a new paragraph in section 5 exploring how 
opposition to nuclear power plants became a valuable tool for the nationalist movements to 
expand their presence in the public space in terms of the political opportunities presented by 
mass mobilizations. Moreover, we have provided further details on the protests carried out in 
the Basque Country, Galicia and Catalonia. We have also commented on the way in which the 
Francoist repressive system affected the protest in Spain. 
We have also completed the section in which the Lemoniz incident is described [Section 6: 
Lemóniz conflict, the drafting of the second National Energy Plan and the reaction of the 
Spanish Atomic Forum (1978)]. The papers by López Romo on the Lemoniz conflict cited by the 
reviewer proved highly valuable for this purpose,  deepening the analysis of the conflict, 
exploring the links between ETA and the anti-nuclear movement in the Basque Country, and 
examining further reactions of the civil society to the event. 
We are grateful to the reviewer for the suggested reading on these topics, improving 
understanding of the links between the nationalist protest and the anti-nuclear movements, 
especially in the Basque Country and Catalonia. 
 
 
Comment 2. Moreover, it is not sufficient to analyse newspapers published in Madrid, such as 
ABC and El País, in order to understand the process. It is essential also to include publications 
by the antinuclear movement, such as:  BIEN - Boletin de Información sobre Energía Nuclear. 
Comité Antinuclear de Catalunya.  A good introduction can be found in:  Alemany, J. (1995). "El 
moviment ecologista a través de les seves publicacions". Catalonia Culture, 42, pp. 32-35.  In  
addition, newspapers which reflect regionalist and nationalist perspectives such as Punto y 
Hora de Eukal Herria, Egin, La Gazeta del Norte, Tele/eXpres, Mundo Diario, Avui, El Periódico 
de Catalunya should be consulted. 
Response: We have now included analyses of two regional newspapers: La Gaceta del Norte 
and El Periódico de Catalunya. Unfortunately, we have been unable to gain access to the other 
suggested sources.  
Comment 3. Furthermore, the structure of the Spanish nuclear programme during the years of 
the dictatorship deserves a more in-depth analysis than that put forward by the author. The in-
fighting within the regime itself during the period of the autocracy, as exemplified by Suanzes, 
its main ideologue, and Otero Navascués, the head of the nuclear programme, are key to 
understanding the success of the change of orientation proposed by the "technocrats" and the 
technological options of the electrical companies, but this is not described in the article.  
Studies devoted to the history of the electrical companies involved are also of interest:  
 Anes, G. y Gómez Mendoza, A.. 2006. "Un siglo de luz: historia empresarial de Iberdrola". 
[Madrid]: Iberdrola. 
 Anes, G., S. Fernandez Plasencia, J. Temboury Villarejo. 2001. "Endesa en su historia (1944-
2000)". Fundación Endesa. 
 Gómez Mendoza, A. 2007. "Electra y el Estado: la intervención pública en la industria eléctrica 
bajo el franquismo." Cizur Menor Navarra. 
 José Luis Ramos- Gorostiza, Luis Pires-Jiménez. "Spanish Economists Facing Indicative Planning 
in the 1960s." SPE/1-2009: 77-108. 
Joseba De la Torre , Mar Rubio, 2013. El Estado y el desarrollo de la energía nuclear en España, 
c. 1950-1985. 
Response: We are grateful for this comment and for the valuable bibliographic 
recommendations. We have added new information and citations on this issue in section 4 
[The nuclear industry in Spain (1962-1976)]  
We have included a new paragraph on the relevance of conflicts and divergences within the 
Spanish Government in order to understand how the view proposed by the technocrats was 
reinforced. We have also expanded our description of the process of development of the 
Spanish nuclear program, based on information provided by the paper of De la Torre and 
Rubio (2013). Furthermore, we have completed the details of the electric companies involved 
in the nuclear sector, using data published by Gómez Mendoza (2007) and Anes et al. (2001). 
We are very grateful for the insights and recommendations of this reviewer, which have led to 
major improvements in our paper. 
